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Vertical and Horizontal Accountability of Global 
Elites: Some Theoretical Reflections and a 
Preliminary Research Agenda 
Ursula Hoffmann-Lange  
Abstract: »Vertikale und horizontale Verantwortlichkeit globaler Eliten: The-
oretische Überlegungen und eine provisorische Forschungsagenda«. Global-
ization has given rise to an ever-increasing number of global elites holding 
leadership positions in transnational institutions, corporations and NGOs. This 
raises questions regarding the structure and accountability of these elites. Are 
they just an abstract category of position-holders representing national or or-
ganizational interests in transnational decision-making or do they rather form a 
cohesive ruling group united by common interests, as some theoreticians of 
globalization have assumed? Elite theory has identified a number of relevant 
characteristics that can be used for assessing the nature of this nascent elite 
formation. These include primarily the prevailing patterns of elite recruitment 
with respect to the representation of societal diversity, the mechanisms of elite 
accountability and the existence of informal rules of conduct that enable the 
accommodation of conflicts of interest. 
Keywords: elites, globalization, elite recruitment, representation. 
Introduction 
Globalization has given rise to an ever-increasing number of transnational 
actors that include global and regional political, administrative and legal insti-
tutions such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Or-
ganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
the International Criminal Court or the European Court of Justice, as well as 
advisory bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) or EUROSTAT. Additionally, large corporations with 
branches in several countries have increasingly developed into global actors for 
whom their country of origin has lost its importance (cf. Sklair 2001, 19). 
Likewise, the number of transnational Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and relief organizations has exploded over the last decades.  
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The individuals holding positions of leadership in these transnational institu-
tions, corporations and NGOs can be considered as belonging to an emerging 
global elite. It is obvious that the transfer of decision-making power to such 
transnational actors raises questions about their personal characteristics, their 
orientations and their basis of legitimacy. Elite theory provides the necessary 
analytical tools for a critical assessment of the character of these elites and the 
degree of their cohesion that is in turn relevant for determining to whom they 
can be held accountable.  
Studies of transnational elites have so far been a preserve of historians and 
specialists in International Relations (IR). While elite research has regularly 
considered military elites as an important sector in its own right (e.g. Aron 
1950; Zapf 1965), it has primarily discussed their role and power within the 
national and not within the international context. If diplomats have been in-
cluded in national elite studies at all, they were considered as part of the na-
tional civil service elite. Only Wolfgang Zapf, in his study of changes and 
continuities in the German elites from 1919 to 1961, treated them as a separate 
elite category, stating that this elite group had considerably increased after 
1945 due to West Germany’s growing international involvement (1965, 88-9). 
Apart from studies of these two elite groups and a growing body of research on 
EU elites, elite research has long neglected the growing number of elites in-
volved in transnational decision-making. Over the last twenty years, various 
studies of higher civil servants working for the European Commission, as well 
as of candidates and members of the European parliament (e.g. Hooghe 2006; 
Schmitt and Thomassen 2002; Scully 2005; Wonka 2008) have explored the 
socialization effects of EU institutions on European elites. This body of re-
search is particularly relevant for answering the central question of whether a 
new type of global elites is emerging whose members lack national ties and 
whose outlook is primarily transnational. 
Elite theory deals primarily with four characteristics of elites in order to as-
sess their relationship with society at large. The first is elite recruitment and 
career patterns. This is the most established field of elite research which pro-
vides information on the exclusiveness vs. openness of elites, i.e. the degree to 
which (formal) restrictions in the access to the elites based on ascribed criteria 
such as ethnicity, religion or rigid class lines exist. Career patterns are impor-
tant because they show whether career opportunities are restricted to a select 
few, e.g. graduates from special elite schools or universities, and whether the 
selection of future elites is already made at an early stage of their professional 
careers. While this is not incompatible with selection according to meritocratic 
criteria, an early closure implies that institutions of elite education play a cen-
tral role in the selection of future elites (Bourdieu 1989). Since gross inequali-
ties of career opportunities based on family background are incompatible with 
democratic principles, data on the social backgrounds and careers of elites 
provide information on the fairness of the prevailing mobility patterns in soci-
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ety (cf. Domhoff 1998, ch. 3).1 Career patterns give evidence on the type of 
qualification prevailing in different sectors and for different positions. Positions 
requiring specialized knowledge can be distinguished from those for which 
generalized leadership abilities are more important and whose incumbents can 
move more easily between different types of organizations (cross-over). 
The second important characteristic of elites is the degree of elite consensus 
vs. elite conflict. The theory of democratic elitism assumes that democratic 
elites pursue conflicting interests and has primarily dealt with the question of 
how such conflicts of interest can be accommodated within the framework of 
liberal democratic institutions (e.g. Aron 1950; Keller 1963; Dahrendorf 1967). 
John Higley and his associates (e.g. Field and Higley 1980; Higley and Burton 
2006, ch. 1) have developed this theoretical model into a comprehensive theory 
of elite types, linking the nature of elite conflict/consensus to the character of 
political regimes and arguing that only liberal democratic elites exhibit a par-
ticular combination of elite consensus on procedural matters and elite conflict 
over policy substance. Such consensually unified elites have historically been 
the exception rather than the rule, and can be distinguished from disunited 
elites that are characterized by the existence of warring elite factions fighting 
for political dominance, on the one hand, and ideologically united elites whose 
unity is based on a common ideology on the other.  
The third characteristic pertains to the question how well elites represent the 
diversity of interests in society. Schumpeter’s model of representative democ-
racy, defined as an open electoral competition for votes and leadership (1942), 
implies that citizens have a meaningful choice in selecting their representatives. 
While the model is based on the expectation that free elections are an effective 
instrument for ensuring the responsiveness of governments to the demands of 
the citizens,2 it is limited to the selection of political representatives, and fails 
to take into account the existence of other elites whose power is not based on 
general elections, but “who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in 
powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes and the 
workings of political institutions regularly and seriously” (Best and Higley 
                                                             
1  Longitudinal elite studies of Western societies show that during the period of democratiza-
tion the share of elites belonging the nobility decreased (Putnam 1976; Rush 2007), while 
the share of elites coming from lower-class backgrounds increased. However, during the 
second half of the 20th century the importance of an academic education for achieving 
higher professional positions has risen dramatically. This implies that the offspring of the 
educated middle-class enjoy a considerable educational advantage. Due to the educational 
aspirations prevailing in such families, their chances of attending prestigious educational 
institutions is much higher, which makes it easier for them to reach elite positions (Gaxie 
and Godmer 2007). Thus, although most formerly existing formal barriers have been abol-
ished, informal mechanisms prevent elites from being representative of the general popula-
tion in their socio-economic backgrounds. 
2  Körösényi’s article in this issue shows, however, that political competition is much more 
limited in practice. 
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2010, 6). The political influence of civil service, military, judicial, economic, 
associational, media or academic elites is therefore not covered by the model. 
This implies that the concept of political representation needs to be extended to 
include the question how the policy preferences of the citizens are reflected in 
the preferences of this broader stratum of strategic elites. In his analysis of 
German society, Ralf Dahrendorf argued that a liberal elite formation is plural-
istic rather than monopolistic and therefore reflects the plurality of interests in 
society (1967, ch. 17). 
Social critics have frequently criticized the theory of democratic elitism be-
cause of its reliance on the mechanism of horizontal accountability, i.e. the 
assumption that competing elites serve as checks and balances for each other, 
thereby bypassing the question of vertical accountability (e.g. Bachrach 1967). 
This leads us to the fourth and most controversial aspect of elites, i.e. the de-
gree of concentration of power. Ruling class theories, as well as power elite 
theories (e.g. Mills 1956; Miliband 1969; Domhoff 1998), have presumed that 
the ostensibly pluralist power structure of modern democracies disguises the 
continued existence of small and unified power elites, whose members primar-
ily pursue their class or positional interests while the interests of the bulk of the 
citizenry are largely ignored.  
This paper is an attempt to provide an overview of the literature on the dif-
ferent groups that make up the global elites, their personal and professional 
backgrounds, as well as their national vs. global orientations. It will also dis-
cuss the normative question of the democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
these global elites. 
Who Belongs to the Global Elites?  
Institutions and Organizations 
There is widespread agreement on the existence of transnational elites in dif-
ferent sectors. The studies by Carroll and Fennema (2002, 2004, 2006) and by 
Kentor and Jang (2004, 2006) confirm an increase in interlocks among the 
largest international corporations, evidenced by rising numbers of board mem-
bers with different national backgrounds. The two teams of authors disagree, 
however, on how far this trend has proceeded. While Carroll and Fennema 
claim that national boundaries are still important, Kentor and Jang emphasize 
the rise of a post-national business elite for whom their national backgrounds 
have lost relevance.  
The economic interests of these power elites are increasingly globally linked 
rather than exclusively local and national in origin … More importantly, these 
elites are outside the control of the nation-states within which they are geo-
graphically located (2006, 604).  
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Scholars in the ruling class tradition, such as Leslie Sklair (2001) and William 
Robinson and Jerry Harris (2000), also claim the existence of a Transnational 
Capitalist Class (TCC), dominated by the heads of the large multinational cor-
porations, although they do not provide more than anecdotal evidence for its 
existence. 
Sklair, who gives his somewhat tautological objective as “to demonstrate 
that the transnational capitalist class is transnational (and globalizing) in sev-
eral respects” (2001, 18), lists four fractions of the global elite: 
- corporate fraction – executives of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
- state fraction – globalizing bureaucrats and politicians 
- technical fraction – globalizing professionals 
- consumerist fraction – globalizing merchants and media (2001, 22). 
At the same time, he assumes that the corporate fraction holds the central 
power-wielders, while the state fraction and the technical fraction play only 
subordinate roles. Although his book deals primarily with the strategies of 
TNCs, it is not a class analysis in a strict sense, nor does he attempt to demon-
strate that the capitalist class exerts political power. Instead, he claims that 
TCC’s power is assumed and asserted:  
The TCC seeks to exert economic control in the workplace, political control in 
domestic and international politics, and culture-ideology control in everyday 
life through specific forms of global competitive and consumerist rhetoric and 
practice (2001, 19).  
He claims  
that at each stage corporate actors and their allies form ‘iron triangles’ of pub-
lic interest groups, regulatory agencies, and Congressional committees, and if 
these are in line with corporate interests, corporations will win the battles over 
legislation (Sklair 2001, 28). 
In plain text, this implies that the preferences of the civil society and political 
actors are frequently in line with corporate interests, and if this is the case, 
legislation will reflect corporate interests. Conversely, one is tempted to con-
clude that, if these preferences are not in line with corporate interests, the latter 
will not necessarily win out. Moreover, Sklair’s analysis completely disregards 
conflicts within the business community itself. Structural neo-Marxist analyses, 
such as Claus Offe’s analysis of class power and the political system, have 
developed a more nuanced picture of capitalism. They suggest that the “influ-
ence theories” explaining the dominance of capitalist interests as the result of 
direct political influence of corporations are inadequate, because the long-term 
interests of the capitalist system of production are better preserved by autono-
mous state institutions (Offe 1973).  
The analysis by Robinson and Harris (2000) is more sophisticated. While 
the authors assume the existence of a global ruling class, they also allow for the 
existence of lower-level elites, e.g. managers of transnational corporations, 
universities, think-tanks, and an incipient set of transnational state institutions. 
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They even acknowledge the existence of conflicts of interest within the TCC 
and distinguish three different fractions, the free-market conservatives, the 
neoliberal structuralists, and the neoliberal regulationists. Despite their Marxist 
vocabulary, they depict an elite structure that resembles what non-Marxists 
would call a pluralist elite. 
Robinson and Harris also claim that the TCC is a class-in-itself and a class-
for itself and that it has become the hegemonic class fraction globally.  
At the level of agency, the TCC is class conscious, has become conscious of 
its transnationality and has been pursuing a class project of capitalist global-
ization, as reflected in its global decision-making and the rise of a transna-
tional state apparatus under the auspices of this fraction (2000, 18).  
This is not an explanation, but rather a statement that one can believe or not.  
It is obvious that neither of these analyses provide a useful starting point for 
identifying members of the global elite because they are preoccupied with the 
class nature of power and consider TNCs as the only powerful global actors. 
Elite theory, however, has instead insisted from the beginning that differenti-
ated societies have several loci of power, and that political power is exercised 
in an autonomous way (cf. Higley and Burton 2006, 5-8). These points are 
widely accepted, and even some Neo-Marxists, such as Claus Offe and Nicos 
Poulantzas (1975), have accepted that state institutions are autonomous actors, 
even though both authors have also emphasized the capitalist nature of the 
state. 
David Rothkopf’s (2008) analysis of what he calls a superclass assumes the 
existence of a global power elite, and he explicitly refers to C. Wright Mills’ 
(1956) analysis of the American elite in the 1950s as an analytic and theoretical 
model. At the same time, though, he claims that the distribution of power has 
fundamentally changed since Mills’ day “not just away from the United States 
and Europe, but away from nations”, and that a new global power elite (super-
class) “plays a similar role in the hierarchy of the global era to the role that the 
U.S. power elite played in that country’s first decade as a superpower” (2008, 
9). He estimates that the entire superclass consists of approximately six thou-
sand individuals: these include top government leaders from internationally 
active countries, key executives and active shareholders of the world’s two 
thousand leading corporations, as well as leaders of terrorist organizations and 
the “masters” of organized crime families (2008, 31-4). Later in the book he 
provides a list of demographic characteristics of these 6,000 individuals and 
lists their institutional affiliations: 50 per cent are from the business and 13 per 
cent from the financial sector; 18 per cent are government officials; 7 per cent 
are military and defence representatives; religious leaders contribute 4 per cent, 
and 2 per cent of the group belong to the shadow elite of organized crime and 
terrorists. Most importantly, he emphasizes that nearly all of them (98 per cent) 
have an institutional power base in one of the institutions listed above (2008, 
291). 
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Rothkopf does not, however, provide the criteria on which he based the se-
lection of the purported 6,000 individuals belonging to this global power elite. 
His examples show that he considers the super-rich, the heads of the large 
transnational corporations and the heads of international bodies such as the UN, 
the WTO, the World Bank, the OECD, the IMF and the EU as important global 
actors. He also mentions networks of leading national politicians who are in-
volved in making global policy decisions, i.e. the heads of government of the 
G8 countries, but also other participants at the meetings of the World Eco-
nomic Forum in Davos, as well as the global media and prominent intellectuals, 
such as Brazilian writer Paul Coelho. Unlike Sklair or Robinson and Harris, 
Rothkopf does not assume that his superclass constitutes a unified elite with 
common interests. Instead, he portrays it as a merely statistical category of 
powerful individuals who may pursue a variety of different objectives. 
The three-volume work edited by IR specialists Christer Jönsson and Jonas 
Tallberg on “Democracy Beyond the Nation State? Transnational Actors in 
Global Governance” claims explicitly to “summarize extant research on trans-
national actors and their role in democratizing global governance” (Jönsson and 
Tallberg 2010, Vol. 1, viii). However, contributions to the three volumes do not 
mention the existence of any studies dealing specifically with transnational 
elites. The research presented is instead devoted to studying organizational 
structures and decision-making rather than the individuals involved in those 
organizations and processes. The contributions deal with a large variety of 
actors, thus suggesting the existence of a fragmented and pluralist structure of 
global elites.  
It is also obvious that the concept of transnational actors is much broader 
than the concept of global elites. Uhlin’s chapter in the third volume, for exam-
ple, outlines purely analytical distinctions which the author considers as “di-
mensions along which we can distinguish between different categories of 
TNAs” (2010, 17). These dimensions relate to abstract concepts, such as moti-
vation, structure, power etc., which can therefore only be used to compare the 
various actors after they have been identified in the first place.3 The reader is 
ultimately left only with the distinction between economic, political and civil 
society actors, which does not help greatly in identifying transnational actors, 
let alone in assessing their relative power. 
                                                             
3  These dimensions are the following: 
- Principal ideas and motivation: instrumental values, knowledge, and normative values 
- Transnational public spheres in which different types of TNAs operate: global market 
economy, transnational political society, transnational civil society 
- Internal structure, ranging from formal, hierarchical organizations to diffuse networks 
- Degree of autonomy, i.e. financial basis 
- Power 
- Degree of politicization 
- Spatial extension of the actor (Uhlin 2010, 17-21). 
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Since the literature discussed above has failed to specify criteria for select-
ing organizations or individuals belonging to the global elites, any empirical 
study will have to start out by identifying relevant sectors, institutions and 
organizations whose leaders can be considered to be globally powerful and 
therefore belong to the global elites. While some of these elites may be “new” 
in the sense that they represent ascending economic sectors (e.g. IT compa-
nies), transnational interest associations and NGOs, as well as transnational and 
international political, administrative or judicial bodies, many of them are in 
fact national elites whose range of activities has increasingly become global in 
scope and who typically represent national interests rather than those of a 
transnational community. Insofar, the interlocks between national and interna-
tional elites are of fundamental interest (cf. Pakulski 2011). 
Background, Careers and Living Conditions 
Most of the literature on global elites does not deal with individual elites and 
does therefore not provide information on their social backgrounds. Indeed, 
Rothkopf is the only author to mention some key demographic characteristics 
of the 6.000 individuals making up his presumed superclass: 93.7 per cent are 
male, their median age is fifty-eight, 17 per cent are U.S. citizens, another 40 
per cent come from just ten important countries (U.S., China, Britain, India, 
Brazil, Russia, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and France), among which represen-
tatives from the emerging world, especially from Asian countries, are the fast-
est-growing group. About 30 per cent attended just twenty elite universities 
(e.g. Stanford, Harvard, the University of Chicago), with almost all (91 per 
cent) holding a first- and nearly half a postgraduate degree. Wealth is finally 
mentioned as a sufficient, albeit not necessary criterion for inclusion. Rothkopf 
claims that “virtually all of the world’s nearly one thousand billionaires made 
the list by definition, and that 60 per cent are at least millionaires” (2008, 291).4 
The author does not mention, however, what criteria he applied in selecting 
these individuals, and he does not explain whether his figures are estimates or 
empirical findings. 
There is also not much evidence of the global nature of the allegedly “global 
elites”. Little is said about their international experience, mobility, or identity, 
and even less is said about the allegedly global scope of their power. It can be 
assumed that familiarity with the living conditions in other countries and cul-
tures facilitates cooperation among individuals from different countries and 
fosters some form of global/international identity. It is also well-known that the 
international mobility of university students has increased during the last dec-
                                                             
4  Sklair only mentions that the members of the TCC share similar lifestyles, particularly 
patterns of higher education and consumption of luxury goods and services (2001, 20). 
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ades, especially in Europe, thus providing possible bases for internationalisa-
tion. But we know very little about how many members of the allegedly global 
elites have spent at least part of their life abroad, including the years spent at 
foreign universities, or how many are “de-nationalized” in their identities, 
commitments and outlooks. A new study of German top-managers confirms 
that international experience has indeed become more important in recent 
years, at least in the economic sector. While the percentage of top managers 
who spent some time of their career working abroad was less than one quarter 
in 1960 (23.7 per cent), it rose to nearly two thirds (63.8 per cent) by the year 
2000 (Freye 2009, 116). Likewise, a longitudinal study of high-ranking Euro-
crats for the period 1960 to 2000 shows an internationalization and Europeani-
zation of the educational institutions attended and the years spent abroad before 
they were appointed to their posts (Georgakakis and Lassalle 2007; Georga-
kakis 2009). 
An interesting, albeit limited study of international financial elites in Singa-
pore confirms that they form a specialized global elite group whose members 
are highly educated, highly-skilled, high-paid, highly-mobile and translocal. 
Members of this elite live in special neighbourhoods, belong to the same clubs, 
and primarily interact with one another and their “western educated/expe-
rienced” Singaporean work colleagues, but not with other local elites (Beaver-
stock 2002). Despite its limitations in terms of sector and numbers (n=24), the 
study shows the emergence of transnational elite networks in certain urban 
places with a high number of expatriates. This is not a new pattern, however, 
because upper-class expatriates have always behaved this way. Nevertheless, 
globalization has contributed to a sharp increase in the numbers of such expa-
triates over the last two decades.  
National vs. Global Orientations 
Do people working for transnational institutions and organizations lose attach-
ment to their native country and start forming something like truly global iden-
tities? Do they form an elite in the sense of a collective for whom national 
background has lost its relevance? These are important theoretical questions 
that are especially pertinent for chief executives of transnational corporations 
who regularly travel back and forth between countries. Their places of work 
and residence as well as the branches that they oversee may change frequently 
and rapidly. They also spend at least a part of their careers abroad. The labour 
market for such top managers has become global and it is easy to imagine that 
they consider the whole world to be home. Indeed, Beaverstock’s analysis 
shows that such managers do not usually identify with their particular place of 
residence, mainly because they know it will only be temporary. Ultimately, 
however, all corporations have their headquarters somewhere, and while they 
may open and close branches all over the globe, it is not so easy to transfer the 
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headquarters of a large TCC to another country. This gives the national gov-
ernments of the countries where the headquarters of such global players are 
located at least some leverage to enforce national standards of conduct and the 
observance of national laws. Even so, the business and financial sectors and 
their elites are certainly more globalized in their outlooks than any other elite 
group. 
The situation is quite different for elites working in transnational institutions 
such as the European Union. The availability of survey data for high-ranking 
EU civil servants and European parliamentarians provides evidence that work-
ing for European institutions contributes to strengthening their European as 
opposed to their national identity, although several empirical studies (e.g. 
Scully 2005; Hooghe 2006; Quaglia, de Francesco and Radaelli 2008) failed to 
uncover strong socialization effects for either category. While the respondents 
supported European unification more strongly than national bureaucrats and 
parliamentarians, let alone the voters of their home countries, the respondents’ 
support for European integration did not increase with length of service. In-
stead, the studies concluded that such support is the result of self-selection 
rather than socialization through working for European institutions. Given the 
transnational character of the EU as a multi-level system, in which national 
interests still dominate the decision-making process, this result is not really 
surprising. 
This is especially true for MEPs since parliamentarians are expected to rep-
resent their national or even sub-national constituencies. Scully’s data reveal 
that MEPs tend to spend part of the week in their home countries, and are in 
regular contact and strongly identify with their national party (2005, 73-4). He 
is therefore critical of the socialization hypothesis and concludes that elites are 
not empty vessels in whom new values can be inculcated simply by their mov-
ing to a new workplace. Instead, he argues that the prevailing incentive struc-
tures need to be taken into account. This implies that MEPs have to balance the 
interests of their national electorate, their national party and their EP party 
group. 
The conclusions from the existing research on EU elites can probably be 
generalized to other transnational political institutions as well. Its main mes-
sage is that national background is (still) much more important in shaping the 
orientations of such elites than the international environment in which they 
currently work. Hooghe (2006) presumes that the main reason for the lack of 
socialization effects is that these elites are usually recruited at later stages of 
their career, i.e. after they have spent a good deal of their professional life in 
their home countries. If this is true for the European Commission, it should 
apply even more to high-ranking officials in international institutions, such as 
the UN or NATO, who are mostly recruited on the basis of national or regional 
quota. 
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These results also indicate that the orientations of transnational elites cannot 
be reduced to the question of national vs. global, but have to be conceived as 
structured by a complex set of role requirements that may be in conflict with 
each other. Such conflicts of interest are inherent in most professional roles and 
are therefore nothing new. This implies, however, that the structure of these 
orientations has to be studied empirically and cannot be imputed. A first step 
would be to look at the elite selectorates and other relevant reference groups, 
which are necessarily different for different elite sectors. 
Legitimacy and Accountability of Global Elites 
Democracies ensure the democratic legitimacy of political representatives by 
general elections. Until recently, such national democratic legitimacy was also 
considered as sufficient for the participation of national politicians in interna-
tional politics. The increased pressure to find solutions for global problems, 
such as climate change, natural or technical disasters, international terrorism, 
and the global financial crisis, however, has increased demand for transnational 
decision-making, as well as adding to the impact of those decisions on the 
living conditions of people. Because such decisions affect people worldwide, 
the legitimation of the relatively small set of national politicians and high-
ranking civil servants involved in those decisions has increasingly been ques-
tioned. Political activists as well as political scientists have criticized the de-
mocratic deficit of transnational institutions, resulting in demands for a better 
democratic legitimation of those institutions. Such demands are especially 
common with regard to the EU, which has acquired decision-making authority 
in a ever-increasing range of policy fields. Demands for more participation 
rights of the EU citizens have eventually resulted in the introduction of the 
direct elections to the EP and the increase of its decision-making powers.  
However, while the demos – a body which is supposed to confer democratic 
legitimacy – is clearly defined in the case of the EU, the same cannot be said of 
other transnational institutions. Moreover, the problem is aggravated by the fact 
that many governments that take part in decisions taken by transnational bodies 
represent countries with authoritarian regimes and cannot even claim democ-
ratic legitimacy for themselves. Traditionally, therefore, transnational bodies 
have been considered as representing countries rather than the citizens of those 
countries, and changing the model of representation would pose practical prob-
lems, particularly a problem of scope. Even more problematic is the fact that it 
is not possible to speak of a global demos in the same sense as a national 
demos. Many scholars have argued that it is not possible even to assume the 
existence of a European demos forming the citizenry of the EU, even though 
the process of European integration started more than 50 years ago and despite 
the fact that the population of the EU member countries, amounting to roughly 
500 million people, is considerably smaller than that of China or India. A 
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meaningful transnational demos presupposes some sense of identification of the 
people with the transnational community, or at least a basic understanding of 
the political implications of elections for transnational assemblies and of the 
political alternatives at stake. If this cannot be assumed to be the case in the 
EU, it is even less justified to assume the existence of a global demos.  
There have been attempts to circumvent this apparent lack of a global demos 
as a necessary precondition for increasing the democratic legitimacy of transna-
tional decision-making bodies, such as the UN and the IMF. Here, a brief over-
view of the theoretical analyses of Näsström (2010) and Grant and Keohane 
(2005) – both dealing with this tricky problem – are useful. Näsström’s article 
is a critique of two models: the all-affected principle, and discursive represen-
tation. These models propose two ways “to speak for the people by construct-
ing a theory without the people” (2010, 197). The all-affected principle cir-
cumvents the lack of a clearly circumscribed global demos by demanding that 
everyone affected by a decision should also be entitled to participate in the 
decision-making. Näsström concedes that this traditional democratic principle 
is valuable as a normative principle for nation-states, but has serious deficien-
cies when considered as a theory of transnational democracy. As such it suffers 
from the problem that its application would require a transnational authority 
entitled to determine the relevant demos for each upcoming issue. Further, 
since the model relinquishes the idea of a single demos, it also fails to specify a 
supreme authority for deciding in cases of disagreement over who is entitled to 
participate in a certain decision (2010, 209). 
The model of discursive representation offers another substitute for the non-
existent global demos. It proposes to represent discourses instead of people. 
This presupposes that it is possible to determine the range of different positions 
taken on upcoming issues and to institutionalize a Chamber of Discourses in 
which all relevant dialogues have a voice. Näsström argues that this model has 
some merit in that it reveals the fact that many interests and ideas are not cur-
rently represented in transnational decision-making. On the other hand, how-
ever, it is also deficient as a theory of democracy, because it proposes to re-
place democratic authorization by deliberation.  
A proposal by Falk and Strauss (2001) offers yet another solution for the 
problem of the non-existent global demos. The authors propose a treaty among 
small number of nation-states to set up a global assembly. They argue that such 
an assembly would initially not be representative of the world’s population, and 
could not have any decision-making power, but they suggest it would attract 
wide attention, gain the increasing support of other countries and gradually 
develop into a more representative institution. They claim that this would be 
analogous to the development of the European Parliament, which also started 
out as a weak assembly and eventually became a major force in European 
politics. However, it is obvious that this analogy is completely mistaken, since 
the European parliament has always been a representative body of all member 
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states. Moreover, the modest turnout at European elections indicates fairly low 
citizen interest in transnational issues, which makes it rather unlikely that such 
a global assembly would be able to gain any democratic legitimacy, at least in 
the short run. 
While Näsström deals mainly with decision-making in supranational politi-
cal institutions, Grant and Keohane (2005) take a broader approach. As the title 
of their article “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics” indi-
cates, their aim is also more modest. Instead of proposing institutional innova-
tions to democratize transnational decision-making, they propose relying on 
mechanisms of accountability that are already available and to apply them in 
practice. They start out by a simple fourfold table, distinguishing two types of 
agents and two types of accountability (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Different Models of Accountability 
 Selectorate 
Conception of Actor Participation model:  
Election by a demos
Delegation model:  
Delegation of authority by a principal 
Instrumental agent Mandate Specified duties and obligations
Discretionary authority Retrospective control Trustee
Adapted from Grant and Keohane (2005, 32). 
 
The authors argue that the participation model cannot be applied to transna-
tional decision-making since there is no such thing as a global demos. They 
claim, however, that accountability can also be secured under the delegation 
model and list seven mechanisms that may be applied to ensure accountability 
to the selectorates and sponsors of transnational actors:  
- hierarchical 
- supervisory 
- legal 
- market 
- peer 
- public reputation. 
The article concludes with the recommendation to improve the use of the avail-
able sanctioning mechanisms for preventing abuses of power by transnational 
actors. 
Grant and Keohane’s article is extremely valuable because it is based on re-
alistic expectations about human behaviour and applicable to all kinds of trans-
national actors. It sidesteps the problem of democratic legitimacy, which en-
sures its universal applicability without ignoring the fact that some trans-
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national actors may in fact enjoy such a democratic legitimacy.5 This looks like 
a much more realistic scenario than the creation of a global parliament with 
only dubious legitimacy. 
Moreover, the emphasis on mechanisms for enforcing accountability has the 
advantage that it can also be applied to private transnational actors, which are 
much more numerous than transnational political actors. The problem of en-
forcing accountability is especially pertinent with respect to transnational cor-
porations, since it has to be achieved by political elites who (still) consider 
themselves foremost as representatives of national interests.  
Conclusion 
The search for relevant literature on global elites has shown that this is an im-
portant but under-researched field. Since globalization has started to produce a 
broad set of transnational actors involved in making decisions that influence 
the living conditions and life chances of people around the globe, the study of 
the leaders of these organizations, their social backgrounds, career patterns and 
orientations should no longer be neglected. Rather than speculations combined 
with anecdotal evidence about the character of a transnational capitalist class 
on one side and demands for improving the democratic legitimacy of transna-
tional political institutions on the other we need to engage in the systematic 
collection of data on different transnational elite groups that allows us to ana-
lyze similarities and differences that exist among and between them. A first 
step would be to peruse the available research on transnational actors in greater 
depth than I have been able to do in this paper and to find out what is already 
known about them. The next step would involve the identification of the most 
powerful transnational actors, as well as the collection of biographical and 
survey materials on the members of this group, and then to start analyzing 
transnational elite networks: this will certainly be a daunting, but a necessary 
and worthwhile task.  
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